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Abstract 
Finding the source of spoofed email is a challenging task for forensic investigators. Header of an email has 
several fields that can be used for investigation. An investigator can easily understand the evidences embedded 
within most of the header fields of an email, except the message-id field. Therefore, there is a need to 
understand how message-ids are constructed and what useful information can be recovered from them.  The 
immediate aim of the analysis is to find the message-id construction mechanism of ‘Sendmail’ mail transfer 
agent (MTA) version 8.14 and how the findings can be used successfully in forensic analysis. Source code of the 
‘Sendmail’ MTA is made use of during analysis. This analysis will uncover several information that will help to 
find email source and validate other email header fields also.  The drawbacks in message-id based forensic 
analysis also discussed here.  
Keywords 
E-mail header, message-id, msgid, sendmail forensics, e-mail forensics, e-mail header analysis, network 
forensics. 
INTRODUCTION 
An electronic mail consists of two parts, the header and the body. The header part carries information that is 
needed for email routing, subject line and time stamps while the body contains the actual message/data of an 
email. The header and the body are separated by a blank line. The header contains several mandatory and 
optional fields (Resnick, 2001). In order to uniquely identify each email all mail transfer agents (MTAs) use 
some sort of unique identifier. This identifier is referred to as ‘Message-ID’. Message-ID field is inserted into a 
header either by mail user agent (MUA) or the first MTA. Even though the Message-ID is optional as per 
RF2822 it recommends using it. Sendmail is one of MTA that handles email delivery and relaying process. 
Sendmail uses message-id for tracing emails and for logging process ids (Costales, Janse, Abmann, & Shapiro, 
2007, p1160). Sendmail recommends including message-id in emails and also it recommends setting relevant 
macros in its configuration file in order to implement compulsory checking of message-ids (Costales et al, 2007, 
p776).  Unlike spoofing other fields in the header, spoofing message-id needs special knowledge. Only technical 
envy spammers can spoof the message-id cleverly. So deep analysis on message-ids may reveal some sort of 
information that will open a window to trace the source of an email. Also the message-id will help to find a 
particular email log entry within a log file of email server.  
Like conventional mail service, when e-mail is routed from source to destination all intermediate relay servers 
(SMTP) insert their stamp at the beginning of the header. This stamping procedure helps to trace the email if 
such a demand arises. The stamp consists of three fields known as ‘From’, ‘SMTP ID’, and ‘For’(Klensin, 2001) 
. Figure 1 shows an email header that passed through several MTAs. Each MTA inserted a unique-id in the 
header of email (Al-Zarouni, 2004). There are several IDs in the header field of an email that may help to trace 
the source of the email but this discussion is limited to sendmail message-id only. Analyzing intermediate SMTP 
IDs is beyond the scope of the discussion. However this paper briefly discusses intermediate SMTP-Ids also. 
 
Received: from search.org ([64.162.18.2]) by sgiserver1.search.org with SMTP (Microsoft Exchange 
Internet Mail Service Version 5.5.2650.21) 
id K9HBB4C4; Mon, 21 May 2001 09:47:01 -0700 
Received: from web14506.mail.yahoo.com ([216.136.224.69]) by SEARCH.ORG 
with SMTP (IPAD 2.52) id 3579700; Mon, 21 May 2001 08:47:23 -0800 
Message-ID: <20010521164640.85785.qmail@web14506.mail.yahoo.com> 
Received: from [216.104.228.118] by web14506.mail.yahoo.com; Mon, 21 May 2001 09:46:40 PDT 
Date: Mon, 21 May 2001 09:46:40 -0700 (PDT) 
From: <can_do1@yahoo.com> 
Subject: check out this e-mail header 
To: todd@search.org 
Figure1: Email header with several identifiers (ID) 
Message-ID 
RFC 2822 states that each email must have a globally unique identifier. This must be included into the header of 
an email. The RFC 2822 also defines the syntax of message-id. It should be like a legitimate email address and it 
must be included within a pair of angle brackets.  According to RFC 2822, message-id can appear in three 
header fields. They are ‘message-id header’, ‘in-reply-to header’ and ‘references header’.  But message-id of the 
present email must be included against the ‘message-id’ header.  
Sendmail Message-ID  
Sendmail Message-ID is formatted with two parts and they are connected by ‘@’sign. It looks like a legitimate 
email address. Right hand side (RHS) of the @ sign is a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) and left hand side 
(LHS) of the @ sign has two parts separated by ‘.’. The LHS part is created with date, time, process id and a few 
random numbers. Shown below is a sample message-id. 
 Message-ID: <200712141511.d872mLVW024467@cs.slt.edu> 
Message-ID is always included within a pair of angle brackets. FQDN makes the MTA globally unique. The 
date and time with the combination of process id and special random numbers make the message unique in a 
particular MTA. This combination makes message-ids globally unique. Figure 1 shows sample sendmail header 
field (Costales et al, 2007, p7). Message-id is typed in blue bolded font. 
  
  
 From you@Here.US.EDU Fri Dec 13 08:11:44 2008 
 Received: (from you@localhost) 
  by Here.US.EDU (8.12.7/8.12.7) 
  id d8BILug12835 for you; Fri, 14 Dec 2007 08:11:44 -0600 (MDT) 
 Date: Fri, 13 Aug 2008 08:11:43      Header 
 From: you@Here.US.EDU (Your Full Name) 
 Message-Id: msgid=<200808131227.m7DCKVem009817@Here.US.EDU> 
 Subject: a test ← note 
 To: you 
  This blank line separates body and header part. 
 Body part of email starts here.       Body 
 
  
 
Figure2: Sample sendmail email structure 
  
 
MESSAGE-ID GENERATION 
 
Sendmail message-id is defined in the following format (Costales et al., 2007, p776).  
 Message-id: $t.$i@$j  
   
 
 E.g.: 200808131227.m7DCKVem009817@Here.US.EDU 
Following paragraphs discuss each part of message-id. 
$t 
$t macro is a current UTC date and time. This is formatted in yyyymmddhhmm. It consists of 12decimal values. 
In the above e.g. the $t part is 200808131227.  If it is decoded the final results will be 2008-08-13 12:27. That 
means the email is handed over to delivery or delivered at 12:27 on 13-08-2008 UTC (Sendmail, 2007). 
$i 
$i is referred as a queue id. It is generated with a special algorithm. Queue id has three different formats with 
respect to sendmail versions. Queue id versions are categorised as ‘before V8.6’, ‘starting with V8.6’ and 
‘starting with V8.10’. Format of queue-id with respect to sendmail versions are given below (Costales et al., 
2007). 
  
 Before V8.6  Æ   AApid    
 From V8.6    Æ   hourAApid  
  From V8.10  Æ YMDhmsSEQpid  
 
Following paragraphs will present a brief description about components ‘AA’ and ‘hour’ and discusses sendmail 
V8.14 in detail. 
AA   
‘AA’ is a combination of English alphabet and other characters. RHS clocks from A-Z (26 characters) and LHS 
clocks from A- ~ (62 characters) until it generates a unique-id.  This provides more than 1600 combinations 
(Costales et al., 2007, p397). 
 
 AA 
 AB 
     . So on... 
 AZ 
     .So on... 
 ~Y 
 ~Z Å failure 
 So on... 
hour 
This maps 24 hour clock to uppercase alphabet. The time starts at midnight and midnight 12 is mapped as A. 
Then 1’ o’ clock is B and so on (Costales et al., 2007, p397). 
Sendmail V8.14 
The message ID of V8.14 consists of three parts. The below example clearly indicates each part (Sendmail, 
2007). In order to make it more understandable each group of components are named as ‘section x’ where x=1, 
2, 3, 4 within brackets directly below each description. 
   
 
              E.g. m7DCKVem009817 
 
 
 
 
Year/month/date           Process ID 
 (Section1)             (Section4) 
    Hour/Min/Sec (UTC) Sequence number 
    (Section2)  (Section3) 
 
The first eight characters can be of any combination from the characters given in table 1(Costales et al., 2007, 
p397). The last 6 digits are process id.   
 
Decimal  
Numbers 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1
0 
1
1 
1
2 
1
3 
1
4 
1
5 
1
6 
1
7 
1
8 
1
9 
2
0 
2
1 
Mapping 
character 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F G H I J K L 
 
 
 
 
Table1: Mapping 
table 
 
Section1 
This part is current UTC time.  Number of years is calculated from 1900 and then is divided by 60.  The 
reminder is mapped to its relevant single character value (Costales et al., 2007, p397).  See below example 
 
Formula: Reminder (R) = (Current year- 1900) % 60  
       Reminder = (2008-1900) % 60 = 48   
  Map 48 in table 1Æ ‘m’ 
2
2 
2
3 
2
4 
2
5 
2
6 
2
7 
2
8 
2
9 
3
0 
3
1 
3
2 
3
3 
3
4 
3
5 
3
6 
3
7 
3
8 
3
9 
4
0 
4
1 
4
2 
4
3 
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4
4 
4
5 
4
6 
4
7 
4
8 
4
9 
5
0 
5
1 
5
2 
5
3 
5
4 
5
5 
5
6 
5
7 
5
8 
5
9 
6
0 
6
1 
h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v x y z 
Months January through December is numbered from 0 to 11. Therefore number 7 must be August. 
Date is represented by ‘D’. From the map table it is 13th. 
Hence the encoded year, month and date is 2008-08-13. 
Section2 
This is current UTC time. This is ordered as hour, minute and seconds. This is coded as hour, minute modulo 62 
and seconds modulo 62 (Sendmail, 2007). Reverse mapping of each letter will decode the originating UTC time 
of the message.  
CÆ 12, KÆ 20, VÆ 31.  So the email is originated or submitted for delivery at 12:20:31 UTC. 
Section3 
This is referred to as sequence number. These two are generated from a random number. Right hand side 
number is quotient and left hand side is reminder (modulo) of a random number.   Seed of the random number is 
created with dynamic unique numbers in order to make the best possible random number. The time period since 
epoch to current time is calculated in seconds and microseconds. Then the total number of seconds, 
microseconds and process id is summed up. This sum  is used as seed for the random number generator Figure 3 
shows the sequence number generation process (Sendmail, 2007). 
 
 
 
                       Quotient  LHS_Seq
            
F (u, us, PID)                 
                      Reminder RHS_Seq 
                  
 
Where F (u, us, pid) = seconds (since epoch) + microseconds+ Process-ID 
 
Figure3: Sequence numbers generator 
Section4 
This is a 6 digit process identifier (PID or Process-ID). This process ID is relevant to the process that attempted 
to deliver the email (Hunt, 2001). Sendmail tries to make Process-ID unique for each queuing process (Costales 
et al., 2007). 
$j 
This macro represents the fully qualified domain name (FQDN). This part starts with local host name followed 
by a dot and other parts of domain information (Costales et al., 2007). Domain names are globally unique. In our 
previous example the $j part was Here.US.EDU. Local host name is ‘Here’ and the local domain name is 
‘US.EDU’. 
TRACING E-MAIL 
In Message-ID generation section we found that the factors used to construct message-id themselves carried 
important information that can be used to trace source of an email. The following paragraphs discuss how this 
will help trace the source of an email message. 
Random 
Number 
Generator 
Creates 3600 
unique 
Sequence 
numbers per 
second per 
process 
Modulo 
by 60 
$j: Fully qualified domain name 
FQDN contains local host name, from where the email was originated or the first sendmail MTA, and other 
domain information. In our previous example Here.US.EDU the first part, preceding the first dot is the local 
host or the first MTA server name. Right side of the first dot is other domain information. Once domain name is 
found then domain’s point of contact and other domain registration details can be found with readily available 
tools (Nelson, Philips, Enfinger, & Steuart, 2008, p484). Some of such web based tools are www.arin.net, 
www.internic.com, www.freeality.com and a command line tool is ‘whois’ (Mulligan, 1999, p32). Once the 
domain administrator is identified then forensic analysers can get her/his help to track the source with message-
id. 
$t: Date and time 
Time is a critical factor in forensic investigation. The time part of message-id provides when the message was 
handed over for delivery. This time information will help to solve some of the problem stated below. 
  
Dynamic IP addressing 
In order to conserve IP address space most ISPs provide dynamic IP addresses. During investigation if IP 
address of the sender is found to be dynamic then the time information will help to search in the billing server 
who used this particular IP address at the specified time. This will help to identify the email sender.  Billing 
servers contain session information such as period of login and allocated IP address for billing purposes. If 
sender used company’s SMTP server then both SMTP log and DHCP log must be collected for analysis (Al-
Zarouni, 2004). 
Remember the time retrieved from message-id is UTC. So it is important to find out actual zone time. This can 
be done in several ways. Country of origin of email can be found from domain name as discussed in section $j. 
Once the country is known then time difference can be determined from several timing servers. Even this will 
help to verify the originating date and time of the email. The calculated time will help forensic analysers to 
check whether the source MTA is in sync with any standard time reference or not.  
Email-server log file 
Sendmail records all SMTP communication between servers in mail.log file. This log file contains date, host, 
process-id, queue-id and the log information. This log file maintains queue-id as a unique-id to distinguish each 
record (Costales et al., 2007, p517). By analysing the log file of source MTA with either message-id or queue-
id, the expected record can be found.  Time stamp and hostname/IP address found in the record can be verified 
with suspected email header so as to confirm the sender. Below figure shows a typical sendmail log file. 
 
 
 
Message-ID   Queue-ID 
 
Figure4: Typical sendmail log file 
The source MTA may be maintained by ISP or it may belong to a company. Forensic analysers will require legal 
authorisation to access the log files. 
In-Reply-To header 
In-reply-to header holds message-id of original message to which it is replying to. Also this may include comma 
separated several message-ids, as a reply to several emails (Costales et al., 2007, p1158). Checking this header 
will help to find other suspicious emails. 
 
  
 
In-Reply-To: <847.193925.780455@hostA.com>, <1021169802.330@HostB.co.th>, 
                    <200106020731.BAA20313@HostC.br.ca> 
 
 
Figure5: An in-reply-to header with a few message-ids 
References header 
In case of threaded emails, continuous correspondence between parties, the reference header holds all message-
ids from the first email to the last email (Loshin, 2000, p 92). Supposing the message-id of the interested email 
is spoofed the other message-ids will help to trace the email source. Figure 7 shows reference header with two 
message-ids. 
Masquerade options 
Sendmail and even some of the other MTAs like Microsoft exchange server support an option called 
masquerade. This option is used to hide the local host behind a local domain name or central email server.  It 
usually rewrites sender address field with local domain name. Then any outgoing email will not have FQDN or 
$j. It might be tricky when tracing email with source address domain name.  But this option does not affect 
FQDN of message-id (Costales et al., 2007, p600). In most of the situations analysing a message-id will help to 
directly locate the local host or the mail server which handled the initial delivery process. Figure 6 shows an 
email header with masqueraded source address.  
 
Return-Path: <abcxyz@unsw.edu.au> 
 
Received: from smtp.unsw.edu.au ([127.0.0.1]) 
 by localhost (snarl.comms.unsw.edu.au [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10025) 
 with ESMTP id j2nhwsBjmdj7 for <satheesaan@slt.com.lk>; 
 Mon, 28 May 2007 12:52:09 +1000 (EST) 
Received: from central12-eng.eng.unsw.edu.au (central12-eng.eng.unsw.EDU.AU [129.94.131.112]) 
 by smtp.unsw.edu.au (8.13.6/8.13.6) with ESMTP id l4S2q9Gm010024; 
 Mon, 28 May 2007 12:52:09 +1000 (EST) 
 
Date: Mon, 28 May 2007 12:53:57 +1000                                             Local host or Local mail server 
 
Message-ID: <D9307185226FDB4FA388C58AE2A347859D34C7@central12-eng.eng.unsw.edu.au> 
 
In-Reply-To: <C280794D.BDAC%eng.faculty@unsw.edu.au> 
 
References: <200705250328.l4P3ShY5024597@smtp.slt.com.lk>              Reference header with multiple 
msgid 
                    <C280794D.BDAC%eng.faculty@unsw.edu.au> 
 
From:  abcxyz@unsw.edu.au              Masquerade with local domain name  
To:      <sssssss@slt.com.lk> 
 
Figure 6: Reference and masquerade header 
In the above figure ‘From:’ field has local domain name ‘unsw.edu.au’ but ‘Message-id field’ and ‘Received 
field’ have the local email server that handled the first delivery process. If investigators can provide the email 
server details that handled the email delivery process, it will help to speed up the process. Consequently it will 
reduce the burden of log file analysis. 
Intermediate SMTP-ID 
As emails go through intermediate MTAs (hops) each MTA insert their unique-id (SMTP-ID) on the email 
header. If it is necessary to analyse intermediate server log file this unique-id is important.  Knowledge about 
intermediate smtp-id also will help to identify any fake smtp-id. Intermediate sendmail servers create a queue id 
as stated in section $i and use it as smtp-id (Costales et al., 2007, p826). Intermediate mail servers stamp starts 
with ‘Received:’ header. Figure6 shows an email that is routed through three sendmail MTAs. Each MTA insert 
their stamp with smtp-id. This smtp-id can be used in log file analysis. 
 
 
Return-Path: <satheesaan@slt.com.lk>  
Authentication-Results: mta379.mail.mud.yahoo.com from=slt.com.lk; domainkeys=neutral (no sig)  
Received: from 203.115.19.199 (EHLO xmail.slt.com.lk) (203.115.19.199) by          
mta379.mail.mud.yahoo.com with SMTP; Fri, 23 Jun 2006 02:24:38 -0700  
Received: from smtp.slt.com.lk (smtp.slt.com.lk [172.25.1.100]) by xmail.slt.com.lk (8.12.11/8.12.11) with 
ESMTP id k5N9LmIO004855; Fri, 23 Jun 2006 14:51:48 +0530  
Received: from slt.com.lk (pop.slt.com.lk [172.25.1.101]) by smtp.slt.com.lk       (8.12.10/8.12.10) with 
ESMTP id k5NKrSuA013912; Fri, 23 Jun 2006 14:53:28 -0600 (GMT)  
Received: from slt.com.lk (slt.com.lk [127.0.0.1]) by slt.com.lk (8.13.1/8.13.1) with ESMTP      
                 id k5N8rfWP021228; Fri, 23 Jun 2006 14:53:51 +0600  
From:  <satheesaan@slt.com.lk>   
To: camalan@celetronix.com.uk,  
Subject: Fw: you've got to see this Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2006 15:53:41 +0700  
Message-Id: <20060623085301.M4685@slt.com.lk>  
In-Reply-To: <000701c6969f$78ff94e0$374019ac@RAIN>  
 
Figure7: Intermediate SMTP-ID 
The pattern of smtp-id and reverse mapping of smtp-id proves that smtp-id is a queue-id. 
FAKE MESSAGE-ID 
Just like spoofing other header fields of email, spoofing message-id is also possible. By observing a few email 
headers where the first MTA is sendmail, it is possible to make a message-id that look legitimate. 
E.g.: 200808131227.m7DCKVem009817@Here.US.EDU 
LHS of the dot is simply date and time and RHS of the dot contains 14 characters, first 8 characters are a 
combination of numbers and English alphabets and other 6 are just numbers.  
So before using message-id for forensic analysis the message-id must be verified for its validity.  
Message-id verification 
Knowledge of sendmail message-id construction will help to verify the message-id. With the help of mapping 
table, $t part can be verified with first 5 characters of $i. The sequence number and process id are dynamically 
created characters so verifying them is difficult.   
Spam identification 
Spam mail filters check for empty message-id or illegal message-id pattern only. The message-id is an optional 
field and it also can be spoofed. So message-id cannot be a reliable spam indicator( Allman,  Assmann, & 
Shapiro, n.d).  
Spam mail senders harvest email addresses through several ways one such method is scanning USENET articles 
( Costale & Flynt, 2005). If any email received from known source is suspected to be sent by spammers, the 
suspected email can be verified by comparing message-id of the email against known good email message-id 
from the same source. However, checking message-id is not a consistent spam checking method because a good 
spammer can create same pattern of message-id. 
ISSUES RELATED TO MESSAGE-IDS 
No Standard algorithm 
RFC2822 standard states every email should have a unique identifier and provides syntax of message-id and 
some suggestion to create unique identifier.  However, it does not define how it should be generated. Email 
software developers use their own algorithm to generate message-ids. Forensic analyser or relevant technical 
advisor must be well informed on the different vendor message ids as he/she might come across different types 
of message-ids.  
This drawback makes it difficult to make a tool for checking validity of message-ids. Sendmail checks message-
id header, if it is blank it will insert a new message-id otherwise it will not alter the available message-id 
(Costales et al., 2007, p834). This vulnerability aids the successful transmission of emails with spoofed 
message-ids. Spoofed message-id will compromise forensic analysis results. 
Open source and closed source 
In case of open source softwares it is possible to find out the construction mechanism of message-ids but it will 
be difficult to determine the message-id construction mechanism in closed source softwares.  
Identifying Source MTA 
There are several MTAs in use. In order to select the suitable analysis procedure investigator must know the 
source MTA. If the source MTA is known it will help to verify the message-id against fake ids. Sendmail will 
not generate new message-id if the email already has a message-id. Some MUA also generate message-ids 
(Costales et al., 2007, p1159). Even the first MTA is a sendmail; the message-id might not be sendmail 
compatible. In this case first smtp-id will help log analysis. This area needs the special attention of researchers. 
Versions 
The message–id algorithm of sendmail has already changed thrice (Costales et al., 2007, p387).  Therefore for 
analysis, continuous research and updates on message-ids is important. Determining the version of the sendmail 
is also necessary before start of message-id analysis. 
Host time 
 
MTA host time must be synchronized with reliable time reference. Since forensic investigation is time sensitive, 
if there is any difference it time it may invalidate the case in court or it may be very difficult to prove in court. 
There are some tools, such as NTP, STIME and GPS clock, that can be used to synchronise the host time (Al-
Zarouni, 2004). Incorrect timing and time setting may cause message-id collision in the specific host itself. 
Spoofed message-ids 
Spoofing email message-ids is possible and it will compromise the forensic analysis. If message-id is spoofed 
with an earlier valid email message-id then this will change the direction of the investigation. This will create 
unnecessary problems and delay in the investigation.  Figure8 shows an email header with spoofed message-id. 
 
  
 Return Path: <dhjmifpo@msn.com>  
Received: from 200.94.239.104 (HELO 216.136.129.5) (200.94.239.104) by 
mta136.mail.sc5.yahoo.com with SMTP; Sun, 27 Jun 2004 17:14:03  
Received: from 162.134.15.76 by 200.94.239.104; Sun, 27 Jun 2004 20:11:02 - 
Message-ID: <P[20  
 
Fighure8: An email header with spoofed message-id from my inbox 
Headers without message-id 
Some emails, especially drafted for illegal activity or spam, do not have message-ids in their headers. In such 
circumstances message-id forensic is not applicable. Below figure shows a successfully delivered webmail 
without message-id.  
 
Return-Path: <good@mta463.mail.mud.yahoo.com>  
Authentication-Results:  mta463.mail.mud.yahoo.com from=yahoo.com;    
                      domainkeys=neutral          
 Received: from 122.44.118.105 (HELO fpyd.net) (122.44.118.105) by  
            mta463.mail.mud.yahoo.com with SMTP; Fri, 05 Sep 2008 16:04:41 -0700  
From: <ptheghost@yahoo.com>   
To: <ptheghost@yahoo.com>  
Subject: Hurry.. Buy US based medications here !..save your money ! MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: 
multipart/mixed;boundary= "----=_NextPart_000_00CA_A0C54188.80C58DC2" Content-Length: 690 
Figure9: Fake header without message-id 
In the above header both ‘From’ and ‘To’ header fields have same address. Thus it is confirmed that the email is 
a fake. Also it does not have a message-id. 
International cooperation 
Message-ID based forensics analysis needs log file analysis. In some occasions the source server might be 
located in another country. To handle this type of situation investigator needs cooperation from that foreign 
country to carry out the analysis successfully.  
CONCLUSION: 
This discussion reveals that email message-id plays an important role in email forensic analysis. The global 
unique feature of message-id helps to distinguish each email and so help in forensic analysis. Knowledge of 
message-id construction part will help to identify spoofed emails, source host, email log file analysis and time 
details. This paper also discussed the ways to determine fake message-ids. Beyond some of the identified 
weaknesses in message-id, the information that is carried by the message-id is highly important in tracing the 
email source.  
This study is carried out only on sendmail message-id. However this area needs more study on other message-
ids that are created by different email software. The key factor in message-id analysis is that the source email 
software must be known to the investigator in order to apply suitable methods during analysis.  
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